Empirical decision-making in diverse species deviates from the predictions of normative choice theory, but why such suboptimal behavior occurs is unknown. Here, we propose that deviations from optimality arise from biological decision mechanisms that have evolved to maximize choice performance within intrinsic biophysical constraints. Sensory processing utilizes specific computations such as divisive normalization to maximize information coding in constrained neural circuits, and recent evidence suggests that analogous computations operate in decision-related brain areas. These adaptive computations implement a relative value code that may explain the characteristic context-dependent nature of behavioral violations of classical normative theory. Examining decision-making at the computational level thus provides a crucial link between the architecture of biological decision circuits and the form of empirical choice behavior.
Introduction
Normative choice theories are the foundation of many modern approaches to decision-making, describing how the ideal or optimal chooser should make choices. In economics and psychology, rational choice models assume that choosers act to maximize a subjective measure of satisfaction termed expected utility [1] . In ecology, optimal foraging theory similarly assumes that organisms act to maximize an internal currency ultimately related to reproductive fitness [2] . Despite the rigorous mathematical framework and intuitive appeal of standard choice theories, empirical choice behavior violates the predictions of these optimality models in a wide range of species [3,4,5 ,6-9] . In particular, biological choosers demonstrate context-dependent preferences, where decisions depend on additional (often irrelevant) information beyond the values of the given alternatives. Here, we review how recent work on the neural representation of value information offers a biological rationale for these apparent violations of rationality. Consideration of such computational principles suggests that choice behavior reflects a utility optimization process operating under intrinsic biological constraints.
Context-dependent violations of rationality
A key principle of nearly all optimal decision-making theories is that preferences rely on a stable, independent valuation of each choice alternative. Given the assumption that individual alternatives are evaluated independently, decisions should be unaffected by uninformative contextual factors such as the previous history or the structure of the choice set. However, many of the documented behavioral deviations from optimality suggest that value is determined in a relative rather than absolute manner, with a characteristic dependence on choice context (Figure 1 ).
The most prominent violations of rationality involve modulation by factors present in the choice set at the time of decision (which we term spatial context, drawing an analogy between the choice set in decision studies and visual space in sensory studies). Under spatial contextdependence, the relative preference between two given alternatives changes with the quantity or quality (attributes) of other alternatives. A number of spatial context effects have been described in human choosers, including the attraction [4], similarity [8] , and compromise [7] effects, each requiring a relationship between attributes defined in a multi-dimensional space. In the attraction effect, for example, the introduction of a third decoy alternative that is similar, but inferior in quality, to one of the two original alternatives can selectively shift relative preference towards the closest original alternative. Interestingly, analogous phenomena exist in diverse and evolutionarily distant species including insects, birds, and monkeys, suggesting context-dependent choice behavior may be intrinsic to biological decision-making mechanisms [3,5 ,6 ].
Context-dependent preferences also vary with the past history of choices and outcomes, or temporal context. While 
